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Abstract
In this paper I exploit IV techniques to study the effect of banning the purchase of
prostitution on rape using Swedish regional data from 1997 to 2014. Recent economic
literature reported evidence on the effect of decriminalizing prostitution on rape. Yet,
little is known on the effect of criminalizing prostitution on rape. This paper exploits
plausibly exogenous within and across regions variation in access to sex tourism to
assess the impact of banning the purchase of prostitution on rape. I find that this
regulation raises rape temporarily. In particular, this regulation increased reported
rape by 47% between 1999 and 2014. Moreover, my findings show that this regulation
also changes the composition of rapes committed: increasing completed and outdoor
rapes, and reducing attempted rapes. This empirical evidence suggests that the incre-
ment in rapes is due to a shift of the demand of prostitution, while I find no evidence
supporting that such an increment is supply driven.
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1 Introduction
The European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (hereafter, FRA) issued the first
official report on violence against women in 2014.1 The report, titled Violence Against
Women: An EU-wide Survey, documents that 1 out of 3 women in the EU has been victim
of physical or sexual violence at least once since the age of 15. In particular, for that same
age group, it was found that 11% of women have been victims of sexual violence and 5%
(a group of around 9 million) have been victims of rape. It is pointed out that the main
psychological consequences for the victims of such crimes are depression, anxiety, loss of
self confidence and panic attacks.
This paper empirically explores the effect of criminalizing the purchase of prostitution
on rape using regional data from Sweden from 1997 to 2014. In particular, I estimate the
effect of issued fines for sex purchase on rape. To address endogeneity issues I use an
instrument exploiting variation in availability of flights (to proxy access to sex tourism).
It is well acknowledged that, even in Western countries, rape is still a gender issue:
women are drastically over-represented among victims of this crime. This feature is com-
mon to all countries, including those where gender violence is severely punished, like in
Scandinavia. For example, according to the Swedish National Council for Crime Preven-
tion, six times as many women as men stated in 2014 that they have been victims of sex
offenses in Sweden.2
Recent economic literature (Cunningham and Shah 2018; Bisschop et al. 2017) has
found causal evidence that decriminalizing prostitution reduces rape. In light of this
evidence, a relevant question is whether criminalizing the purchase of prostitution affects
rape. Research on this topic will allow social politicians to design crime policies for rape
and regulations for the prostitution market according to their objectives.
The main finding of this paper is that fines for sex purchase increase rape. These
estimates are economically meaningful, and suggest that an increase of one standard de-
viation in fines for sex purchase boosts rape by around 15%. These estimates also suggest
that criminalizing the purchase of prostitution increased reported rape by 47% between
1999 and 2014.
Next, I explore whether supply or demand are driving these results. I find evidence
supporting that the effect is demand driven. I do not find any evidence in favor of a
decrease of the supply of prostitution (proxied by pimps). While, I find important changes
in the sort of rapes committed by aggressors. My findings show that banning the purchase
1European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2014)
2The precise figures are 1.8% of women and 0.3% of men.
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of prostitution reduces attempted rape, at the expense of raising completed and outdoor
rape.
This paper contributes to a growing line of research in economics that studies prosti-
tution either theoretically (Edlund and Korn 2002; Cameron 2002; Cameron and Collins
2003; Della Giusta et al. 2009) or empirically (Cameron et al. 1999; Moffatt and Peters 2001;
Gertler et al. 2005; Gertler and Shah 2007; Arunachalam and Shah 2008; Della Giusta et al.
2009; Edlund et al. 2009; Della Giusta 2010; Cunningham and Kendall 2011a,b,c; Bisschop
et al. 2017; Ciacci and Sviatschi 2016; Ciacci 2017). In particular, it contributes to a strand
of the literature addressing the effects of different prostitution laws on crime or health
outcomes (see, inter alias, Lee and Persson (2013); Cho et al. (2013); Jakobsson and Kot-
sadam (2013); Berlin et al. (2019); Cameron et al. (2019)). Finally, this paper contributes to
instrumental variable literature suggesting to use Oster (2017) methodology as a bench-
mark to compare OLS and IV estimates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents rape, prostitution and
sex tourism in Sweden. Section 3 describes the data sets used in this paper. Section 4
presents the empirical strategy. In Section 5, I present the main results of the paper. Sec-
tion 6 explores the potential pathways leading to the main findings of the paper. Finally,
Section 7 concludes.
2 Rape, prostitution and sex tourism in Sweden
2.1 Rape
It might be argued that Sweden has one of the widest definitions of rape (Von Hofer
2000). In 1962, a legal definition of rape was included in the Swedish Penal Code and
since then, several revisions to the legal definition of rape have been made to include
non-consensual sexual acts comparable to sexual intercourse. In 1965 Sweden was the
first country to criminalize marital rape. While, in 2005 sexual acts with someone who is
unconscious (e.g. due to intoxication or sleep) were added to the legal definition of rape.
Consequently, it is not surprising that Sweden has presented the highest number of
rapes committed in Europe since the Council of Europe started the data collection of this
crime. According to the criminology literature three important factors explain this feature
(Von Hofer 2000). First, as explained above, legal factors: the Swedish legal definition of
rape is broader compared to other European countries. Second, statistical factors: Sweden
has a system of expansive offense counts and crime data is collected when the offense in
question is first reported, even if later investigations indicate that the offense must be
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given an alternative classification. Expansive offense counts means that a victim that
reports being abused during a period of time should provide details about the number
of times the crime occurred, so the offense will not be counted as one but as the number
of times reported by the victim. Third, substantive factors: countries with high levels
of sexual equality, and low police corruption, exhibit higher propensity to report rape
offenses.
2.2 Prostitution
Prior to 1999 prostitution was not regulated in Sweden. Yet, pimping (i.e. procuring
sexual services and/or operating a brothel) and human trafficking were illegal. In Febru-
ary of 1998 the Swedish Parliament discussed to criminalize the purchase of prostitution.
This bill, also known as Kvinoffrid (women’s integrity) law, combinedmeasures to prevent
both sexual harassment at work and prostitution.
Twomonths later criminalization of the purchase of sex became the object of a separate
provision known as Sexko¨pslagen (sex purchase act) that prohibits to buy sexual services,
but not to sell them. The ban became effective in January 1999 making Sweden the first
country to introduce this type of regulation. More specifically, since January 1999 prosti-
tutes’ customers in Sweden face the risk of receiving a fine or up to 6 months of prison for
buying sexual services. In April 2005 the provision was transferred to the Swedish Penal
Code.3
2.3 Sex tourism
Sex tourism is a relatively recent phenomenon in which prostitutes’ customers travel
in order to buy sex abroad. TheWorld TourismOrganization defines sex tourism as ”trips
organized from within the tourism sector, or from outside this sector but using its struc-
tures and networks, with the primary purpose of effecting a commercial sexual relation-
ship by the tourist with residents at the destination” (Steinman 2002).
Nowadays sex tourism is mainly associated with the cross boarding of tourists from
”developed” to ”developing” countries. In effect, according to the literature Brazil and
Thailand are two of the most popular destinations for Swede sex tourists (Weibull 2003;
Manieri et al. 2013). Furthermore, sex tourism became a growing phenomenon in Sweden
and the Parliament even discussed to ban the purchase of sex abroad (Pruth 2007).
3For further information see Svanstro¨m (2005).
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3 Data
In this paper, I use data on the number of fines for sex purchase and rapes in short
time windows (months). The data used in this paper comes from ”The Swedish National
Council for Crime Prevention” (also known as and hereafter, Bra˚). Bra˚ is the most impor-
tant institution for crime data collection in Sweden. Among other types of crime data,
it collects data of crimes reported to police officers. Hence, it provides detailed informa-
tion on the number of sex crimes and on the number of fines for sex purchase since the
enforcement of the ban in 1999.4
For each of the 21 regions of Sweden, I have collected data about reported rapes and
issued fines for sex purchase at monthly level between 1997 and 2014 . Figure 1 shows
the number of rapes and fines for sex purchase during the sample period considered in
this paper. Two features are worth highlighting. First, there is considerable variation in
fines for sex purchase. Second, both variables exhibit an upward trend during the sample
period.
Table 1 shows summary statistics for rapes, fines for sex purchase and pimps. Rapes
are classified according to whether the sexual intercourse was completed and the place
where the crime occurred.5 This table separates statistics in three time periods. Panels A,
B and C respectively display descriptive statistics for thewhole sample period, the sample
period before the introduction of the ban (i.e. 1997 and 1998) and the sample period sub-
sequent to the introduction of the ban. Data show similar patterns across the three panels.
The majority of rapes are comprised by completed and indoor rapes. Furthermore, for all
variables the mean is greater than the median, as illustrated by the right-skewed distri-
bution of rape displayed in Figure 2.
In addition, this paper also makes use of data on the number of police officers hired
by each region from 1997 to 2014 to account for the degree of enforcement of the law. This
data is drawn from ”The Swedish Police”. Since police recruitment take place each year
this variable does not exhibit monthly variation within a given year. Descriptive statistics
on this variable are available upon request.
Finally, I use data drawn from Google and ”The Swedish Transport Agency”. In par-
ticular, from Google Maps I collect data on the distances from each region to the closest
airport in a radius of 60 km. Figure 3 shows an example of how such distances are com-
puted. Lastly, data on the number of flights of Swedish airports are drawn from ”The
Swedish Transport Agency”.6
4Data on other sorts of crimes are drawn from this source as well.
5Therefore, two mutually exclusive categories: completed vs attempted, and outdoor vs indoor.
6In this database data in 2005 for a few airports are missing.
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4 Empirical strategy
4.1 Structural regression model
In order to explore the association between fines for sex purchase and rape I consider
the following regression model:
log(1 + rapermy) = βfinesrmy + αr + αm + αy + αr ∗ y + γofficersry + εrmy (1)
where r stands for region, m for month and y for year. The dependent variable is
log(1+ rapermy) since rape takes value 0 for some months in some regions, finesrmy is the
number of fines for sex purchase issued by police officers in region r in monthm and year
y; αr, αm, αy are respectively fixed effects for region, month and year; αr ∗ y is a region-
year trend and the control variable officersry is the number of police officers in region r
in year y since police officers are hired by regions every year.7 Variation comes from the
different number of issued fines for sex purchase within and between regions across time.
Following the stream of the literature reporting that decriminalizing prostitution de-
creases rape, it seems reasonable to expect that criminalizing the purchase of prostitution
has the opposite effect. However, ex-ante the size of the effect is not clear since the two
effects might not be symmetrical. Even if the penalty associated to each crime consider-
ably differs (being much higher for rape), criminalizing sex purchase increases only the
penalty associated to prostitution and therefore this could push some prostitutes’ cus-
tomers to commit rape.8
In this setting there might concerns that OLS estimates are not causal due to endo-
geneity. To address partly this issue, regression model (1) is considerably demanding. It
includes fixed effects at region, month and year level, plus region-year trends to capture
any variation at seasonal or geographical levels.
Given selection into treatment in this setting, reverse causality and omitted variable
bias seem the the main concerns connected to endogeneity of the treatment variable. Re-
verse causality arises from the concern that past values of rape could affect fines for sex
purchase. On the one hand rape could affect fines for sex purchase via the supply of
7I control for the number of officers hired in each region following a strand of the literature that found
that increasing officers decreases crime rate (see, inter alias, Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004); Draca et al.
(2011)). Moreover, it seems reasonable to think that the number of fines might correlate with the number of
officers.
8Note that it might also be that prostitutes’ customers rape prostitutes (i.e. do not pay for sex purchase)
now that prostitution is more expensive.
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prostitution, a strand of the literature has found that around 60% to 70% of prostitutes
have been victims of rape (Farley and Barkan 1998; Farley et al. 2004) and that rape of
prostitutes rarely ends in conviction of aggressors (Anderson 2004; Sullivan 2007). There-
fore, prostitutes could prefer to avoid regions which experience large numbers of rape.
On the other hand rape could affect fines for sex purchase via the demand of prostitu-
tion, given the causal evidence that decriminalizing prostitution reduces rape, periods
with larger rapes could be associated with periods with fewer demand of prostitution.
More generally, omitted variable bias arises since I cannot control for variables that dis-
place prostitutes and might be correlated with my treatment. Namely, the concern is that
such variables would decrease fines for sex purchase and increase rape. Both these issues
would cause my OLS estimates to be downward biased.9
Moreover, the dependent variable could be measured with error since rapes (unlike
fines for sex purchase) are under-reported. If such measurement error is random, this
would cause the OLS estimates to be less precise.
4.2 Instrument
To deal with the issues discussed above I construct two instruments that use variation
in flights to proxy access to sex tourism. According to the literature the main destinations
of European sex tourists, and in particular Swedish sex tourists, are developing countries.
Consequently, intercontinental flights are the main mean of transportation for Swedish
sex tourists. Plausibly sex tourists seem more (less) likely to travel in months in which
there is a higher (lower) supply of intercontinental (continental) flights. In effect, ideally I
would like to exploit monthly boosts in the number of such flights in the main airport of
the region.
I solve this issue in two steps. First, in order to locate the main airport of the region, I
match each region with the closest airport in a radius of 50 km if any.10 Second, to mea-
sure months in which there is a relatively larger supply of intercontinental flights I use
as instruments the number of intercontinental (continental) flights that are one standard
deviation above (below) the yearly mean of each airport.11 This generates two sources
of identifying variation. First, within-regions identifying variation arises from months in
which there are relatively many (few) intercontinental (continental) flights and the num-
9Yet, since my OLS estimates are positive, reverse causality and omitted variable bias imply that the
population regression coefficient is larger than OLS estimates. Appendix Section D addresses reverse
causality.
10In Section 4.3 I show evidence on the robustness of the chosen distance. Furthermore, Appendix Table
A.1 shows the closest airport to each county.
11Distances from the region to the airport are computed using Google Maps.
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ber of such flights. Second, between-regions identifying variation is due to the distance
between each region and the closest airport. Formally, fines for sex purchase are instru-
mented with:
z1rmy = IC. flightsrmy ∗ I (IC. flightsrmy > µ1ry + σ1ry) (2)
z2rmy = C. flightsrmy ∗ I (C. flightsrmy < µ2ry + σ2ry) (3)
where IC. flights and C. flights respectively stand for intercontinental flights and
continental flights, I() is the identity function, µ1ry and σ1ry stand for the yearly average
and standard deviation of intercontinental flights and µ2ry and σ2ry stand for the yearly
average and standard deviation of continental flights. Appendix Section A presents de-
scriptive statistics and figures on the instruments.
4.2.1 Identification assumption
The key identifying assumption is that variation in the offering of (inter)continental
flights must be independent of rape and fines for sex purchase patterns. In other words,
the choice of flight companies to offer relatively more intercontinental flights does not
depend on any reason connected to rape or fines for sex purchase. This seems plausible
since there is no evidence of flight companies that choose to offer more flights due to any
reason connected to crime patterns.
Indeed, variation in flights seems to be a good instrument in this setting. First (exogene-
ity), as discussed above, flights are plausibly randomly assigned with respect to rape and
fines for sex purchase.12 Second (exclusion restriction), it does not seem plausible that they
can affect rape in other ways than via prostitution. Sex tourism exploits differences in the
regulation of prostitution across countries. So prostitutes’ customers travel to other coun-
tries where prostitution is more tolerated, or even legal. Yet, to the best of my knowledge,
this is not the case for rape since this crime is neither legal nor tolerated in any country.
Hence, there is no reason to believe that the offering of flights could directly affect rape.13
Third (relevant instrument), this instrument affects the (potential) endogenous regressor:
fines for sex purchase are less likely to occur in months with sex tourism.14 In other
words, increases in the relative offering of intercontinental flights in a given region should
12Appendix Section B empirically explores the plausibility of this assumption and finds no evidence
supporting it.
13Section 5.3 offers empirical evidence on this issue.
14Section 4.3 addresses this issue.
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decrease fines for sex purchase.15 Furthermore, since the main destination of Swedish sex
tourists are developing countries, if these instruments are proxing access to sex tourism
the effect of z1rmy should be larger in absolute value than that of z2rmy. An assumption I
can easily test in the first stage regression.16
4.3 First stage results and robustness
I claim that variation in relative offering of intercontinental flights is a good proxy
for access to sex tourism. I cannot directly test this hypothesis since, to the best of my
knowledge, data on sex tourism in Sweden do not exist. However I can use robustness
tests and randomization inference to check how likely is that the instrument is strongly
correlated to the endogenous regressor by chance.17
Table 2 reports first stage results. Each column reports the results of a different re-
gression. The table is divided in three panels. Panel A reports results using z1rmy and
z2rmy, while Panel B and C test the robustness of these results changing the distance of
the included airport. All regressions control for the number of police officers and have
year, month and region fixed effects, region year trends and clustered standard errors at
regional level.
Column (1) of Panel A reports the results for the main specification. As expected, the
coefficients associated to z1rmy and z2rmy are negative. Moreover, they are strongly signifi-
cant: Kleibergen and Papp F-stat (hereafter, KP F-stat) is around 78. The last row of Panel
A reports the p-value associated to the null hypothesis that the coefficient associated to
z1rmy is larger than that associated to z2rmy. It is encouraging to find that this p-value is
lower than 0.01. Since in the sample there are 21 regions and so 21 clusters, column (2)
of Panel A reports the results of the same regression model as in column (1) but using
wild-cluster bootstrap (Cameron et al. 2008). Results barely change.
There could be the concern that these results depend on the use of the two instruments.
To tackle this issue I report results separately for z1rmy, z2rmy and the sum of the two (i.e.
z1rmy + z2rmy). Columns (3) and (5) respectively use either only z1rmy or z2rmy. Whereas,
columns (4) and (6) run the same regressions using wild-cluster bootstrap. Columns (7)
15Relative offering of intercontinental flights means offering of intercontinental flights with respect to
offering of continental flights. Therefore, large relative offering of intercontinental flights means large z1rmy
and z2rmy . This is a monotonicity assumption. In view of this assumption, it is easy to embed this analysis
in a Local Average Treatment Effect (LATE) framework.
16There might be the concern that the identifying variationmight correlate with seasonality since airlines
decide their flight destinations based on months of the year. Appendix Section C tackles this issue.
17As for randomization inference, in order to assess the robustness of the first-stage I randomize the
instruments across different time periods. Specifically, this exercise is useful as a further robustness check
to test whether the instruments are strongly correlated with fines for sex purchase.
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and (8) use as an instrument z1rmy + z2rmy, the former using standard clustered standard
errors at regional level, the latter using wild-cluster bootstrap. Panel B and C repeat the
same analysis changing the distance of the airport radius to either 40 km or 60 km. It is
reassuring to find that results are stable across each regression of these three panels. In
particular, coefficients are statistically negative and KP F-stats support the instruments
are relevant.
There could be the concern that the instruments do not proxy access to sex tourism. it
might be that they are simply proxing a general effect of flights on fines for sex purchase
in the first stage regression and on rape in the reduced form one. To this extent, it is worth
mentioning I make use of variation in relative offerings of intercontinental flights since
there is a strand of the literature suggesting that inercontinental destinations are the most
popular for sex tourisms organized by Swedish.
Hence, to tackle this concern, I use variation of flights that, to the best of my knowl-
edge, are not connected to sex tourism. As a consequence, such flights should not affect
either fines for sex purchase or rape. Namely, I use the number of national flights, euro-
pean flights and total flights.
Table 3 shows the results of the afore-mentioned specifications. z3rmy, z4rmy and z5rmy
respectively stand for national flights, european flights and total flights. I find no evidence
that these flights affect either fines for sex purchase or rape. Note that since the number of
total flights encompasses the number of international flights I might expect this variable
to have a negative associated coefficient.
Next, I turn to randomization inference. Figures 4 and 5 respectively present the re-
sults of randomizing z1rmy and z2rmy stratified at (larger) regions and time period level
with 1,000 permutations.18 The red vertical line depicts the estimated coefficient in the
main specification. The intersection between the red vertical line and the estimated dis-
tribution could be interpreted as the probability of finding by chance an estimated co-
efficient as large as the estimated coefficient of the main regression. Simply put, these
p-values measure the probability that, under the null hypothesis of no effect of each in-
strument, the estimating bias is sufficiently large to explain the size of the estimated co-
efficient. Figure 4 and 5 show that this probability is extremely low. In the former 1
regression out of 1,000 could replicate such estimate, in the latter only 8 regressions out of
1,000 could replicate such estimate. Furthermore, there could be the concern that varia-
tion in my instruments is highly correlated across space and time (i.e. some geographical
areas have larger airports and so relatively more intercontinental flights and/or this vari-
ation may take place in the same months/season). Randomization inference is useful to
18Following the Bra˚ division, Sweden is geographically sub-divided into 6 larger regions.
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shed light on this issue as well.
5 Main results
5.1 OLS vs IV results
Table 4 compares OLS and IV results. IV are computed instrumenting finesrmy in
equation (1) with z1rmy and z2rmy. Columns (1) and (2) compare OLS and IV results clus-
tering variance at region level and including region FE, region-year trends and controlling
for officers. Columns (3) and (4), and columns (5) and (6) respectively add year FE and
month FE.
OLS estimates become larger in size and gain significance as controls are added. This
pattern supports that there could be confounding factors negatively correlated with the
main regressor (in line with 4.1).
Column (6) presents the results of the main specification. In line with the above-
mentioned pattern, it is not surprising to find that IV estimates are about an order of
magnitude larger than OLS. These results point out that issuing fines for sex purchase
boosts rape. Moreover these results are economically meaningful, an increase of one stan-
dard deviation of the main regressor increases rape by 15%.19 With respect to the baseline
mean of the dependent variable this coefficient means that an increase of one standard
deviation of the main regressor brings about almost one extra rape. In other words, given
the baseline mean of the dependent variable (6.16), an increase of one standard deviation
of fines for sex purchase increases rape by roughly one unit.
Appendix Section E finds that this effect is temporary and takes place only in the very
same month in which fines are issued. Since between 1999 and 2014 there have been on
average 23.5 fines for sex purchase per month in each region, this suggests criminalizing
the purchase of prostitution raises rape by roughly 47%. These results are in line with
those encountered by scholars. Cunningham and Shah (2018) finds that decriminalizing
prostitution reduces rape by 30%, whereasBisschop et al. (2017) finds that street prosti-
tution zones decreases rape by 30-40%. Finally, as highlighted in Cameron et al. (2019),
these findings also suggest that criminalizing prostitutionmight bring about larger effects
in absolute value than decriminalizing prostitution.
Taking into account the main specification results (i.e. column (5) vs column(6)), IV
estimates are about 15 times larger than OLS. There are four main reasons why this could
19Note that issuing a fine increases rape by 2%. Precisely, ∂ log(y)∂x =
∂ log(1+y)
∂x
∂ log(y)
∂ log(1+y) = β
1+y
y ≃ βˆ
1+y¯
y¯ =
1.89% 1+11.3811.38 = 2%
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happen. First, it might be that the instruments are weak. Second, it might be that the
exclusion restriction is violated. Third, it might be due to endogeneity: reverse causal-
ity/confounding factors correlated with the endogenous regressor. Fourth, since IV is
local, it might be that compliers are more sensitive to changes in fines for sex purchase to
commit rape.
Except for the first reason: instrument relevance, the other three reasons are untestable.
However, this paper deals with each one of them. Section 4.3 shows that instruments are
strongly correlated with the endogenous regressor. Section 5.3 handles the exclusion re-
striction and finds no evidence supporting any violation of such an hypothesis. Appendix
Section D finds evidence in favor of reverse causality. Lastly, Section 5.4 compares OLS
and IV estimates in two ways. First, it makes use of the methodology developed in Oster
(2017), and finds evidence supporting the plausibility of IV estimates. Second, this section
also explores whether there is evidence that the IV estimates differ from OLS since their
averaging the causal effect only for the compliers.
5.2 Sensitivity to model specification changes and to functional forms
of dependent variable
This section shows that results are robust to changes to: instruments, regressionmodel
and functional form of the dependent variable. This section addresses this issue sepa-
rately. First, it provides evidence that such results are robust across changes to the in-
struments and regression model. Second, it explores whether such results are robust to
changes in the functional forms of the dependent variable.
Table 5 reports IV results using different instruments. Panel A displays regression
outcomes for the instruments used in the main specification. As a matter of fact, column
(1) reports results of the main specification (i.e. instrumenting finesrmy in equation (1)
with z1rmy and z2rmy) for ease of comparison. While, columns (2) and (3) respectively show
results of using only z1rmy or z2rmy as instruments. Lastly, column (3) displays results of
using z1rmy + z2rmy as instrument. This analysis is in line with table 2.
Results are stable across columns. In particular, it is easy to see that estimated coef-
ficients are always closer than one-standard-error distance to the estimated coefficient of
mymain specification (i.e. Panel A, column (1)). Moreover, as expected the point estimate
of the estimated coefficient using z1rmy is larger than the one using z2rmy.
Panel B and C repeat the same analysis changing the distance of the airport radius to
either 40 km or 60 km. Also in this case, estimated coefficients are statistically equal to
themain specification one. These findings suggest that results are robust across regression
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models and changes in instruments.
Finally, Table 6 presents regression results using, as functional form of the dependent
variable, the inverse hyperbolic sine (hereafter, IHS) transformation.20 Columns (1),(2),
and (3) respectively use these two instruments with a distance of 50 km, 40 km and 60
km. While, column (4) uses the sum of the two instruments as one instrument.21 Results
are stable across regressions.
5.3 Exclusion restriction
There might be the concern that the exclusion restriction is not valid. In other words,
there might be concerns that variation in offering of flights directly affects rape. This hy-
pothesis looks unlikely since, as I explained previously, sex tourism is a direct alternative
to prostitution and not to rape.
This identification strategy rests on the assumption that variation in offering of flights
affects rape only through fines for sex purchase (i.e. demand of prostitution). This is
tantamount to stating that sex tourism is an alternative to sex purchase and affects rape
only via its effect on sex purchase.
Testing the credibility of the exclusion restriction requires deep knowledge of the sub-
ject matter. In this setting it might be argued that it is possible to test the plausibility of
such assumption using data prior and posterior to the introduction of the ban. In effect,
if the instruments only affect rape via fines for sex purchase, the effect of the instruments
on rape should be weaker when there were no fines for sex purchase since the ban was
not effective. On the other hand, if the instruments directly affect rape there is no reason
to believe that their effect on rape should be less strong before the introduction of the ban.
Table 7 tests this assumption comparing reduced form estimated coefficients prior and
posterior to the introduction of the ban. Columns (1) to (3) present the results before the
introduction of the ban. As in table 4, each column respectively adds year fixed effects
and region-year trends. Columns (4) to (6) present results in the same fashion but for the
period after the introduction of the ban.
It is heartening to find that prior to the introduction of the ban no estimated coefficient
is statistically negative in any regression. As a matter of fact, the estimated coefficient
associated with z2rmy is even positive. After the introduction of the ban both estimated
coefficients are statistically negative in the three regressions. This evidence suggests that
20The IHS transformation is defined as log
(
y +
(
y2 + 1
)1/2)
. It is an alternative functional form to
log(1 + y) when the dependent variable might take a zero value.
21A table with the same format as Table 5 but IHS is available upon request. Also in this case in each
regression the estimated coefficients are not statistically different from the main regression one.
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the effect of the instruments on rape changed with the introduction of the ban, and as a
consequence, the introduction of fines for sex purchase.
Since the coefficient associated to z1rmy of Table 7 is negative but statistically equal
to zero, there might be the concern that this lack of significance is merely due to lack
of precision since the number of observations available before the ban are fewer than
those available after the ban. To this end, I focus on the period after the ban and define
a cumulative variable for fines by region. This variable cumulates the number of fines
for each region as time elapses. Next, I separate the sample in data above and below the
median of the cumulative variable to have roughly the same amount of observations.
It seems plausible to believe that cumulative fines proxy both prostitution and how
strict the police enforces the ban. According to the exclusion restriction, the effect on rape
should be larger in absolute value whenever the law is enforced stricter and prostitution
is more difficult to purchase. Note that this analysis leverages variation during the ban
while the previous one was using variation before vs after the ban.
Table 8 shows the results of these reduced form regressions. Columns (1) to (3) show
results below the median, whereas columns (4) to (6) display results above the median. It
is encouraging to find that coefficients below the median are positive, while coefficients
above the median are negative as the exclusion restriction would suggest.
As a whole, this evidence supports the exclusion restriction: it seems the instruments
affect rape differently depending on the introduction of the ban and, after its introduc-
tion, depending on how difficult buying prostitution is. This evidence supports that the
instruments affect rape only through fines for sex purchase.
5.4 Size IV estimates
A simple comparison of the ratio between OLS and IV estimates could raise concerns
that IV estimates are far too large than the OLS. To tackle this issue, I use a newmethodol-
ogy suggested by Oster (2017) and adapted to an IV framework in Ciacci et al. (2019). Os-
ter (2017) develops a methodology that makes use of changes in the estimated coefficient
and R2, as controls are included, to test for omitted variable bias. The afore-mentioned
paper shows that, if selection on observables is proportional to selection on unobserv-
ables, then one can compute an estimated coefficient taking into account omitted variable
bias. The set bounded between such estimated coefficient and the OLS estimates is the set
of values of the coefficient that could be explained given omitted variable bias. Intuitively
this set spans all the ”true” values of the treatment effect given omitted variable bias.
It is a common praxis to comment the size of IV estimates compared to OLS. To the
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best of my knowledge, usually this comparison is carried out using ”subjective” rules of
thumb comparing the relative size of both coefficients. In effect such rules of thumb do
not take into account information on coefficient movements as controls are included nor
movements in R2. Yet there is no paper suggesting a method to quantify such size.
When endogeneity boils down to omitted variable bias, Oster (2017)’s identified set is
a valid benchmark for OLS vs IV estimates comparison since it includes all the values of
the estimated coefficient that could be driven by this sort of bias. In other words, if the
IV estimates are in this set they are not too far from the OLS estimates. In addition, since
Oster (2017) establishes that for each estimated coefficient there is a single coefficient of
proportionality between selection on observables and selection on unobservables, com-
puting the coefficient of proportionality corresponding to the IV estimates yields an ob-
jective benchmark about the size of omitted variable bias needed to produce such result
using OLS.
In order to compute this set one needs to have a prior belief about the sign and size
of proportionality between selection on observables and unobservables, in the setting
studied in this paper the main concern is that Cov(finesrmy, εrmy) < 0, or following Oster
(2017)’s notation, denoting the set of controls with W1 and the omitted variable causing
the endogeneity withW2:
δ
Cov(finesrmy,W1)
V ar(W1)
=
Cov(finesrmy,W2)
V ar(W2)
for some δ ≤ −1. Hence, I evaluate negative coefficients of proportionality.22
I compute Oster (2017)’s estimated coefficient taking into account omitted variable
bias for different negative values of the coefficient of proportionality (denoted by δ). In
each case I get values larger than the OLS estimates, hence upper-bounds of Oster (2017)’s
identified set.
Figure 6 shows the estimated upper-bounds of the identified set as a function of the
coefficient of proportionality δ. Note the lower-bound of the identified set is the OLS
estimate of structural specification (1) (i.e. Column (5) of Table 4). On the vertical axis of
Figure 6 there is δ, on the horizontal axis there is the estimated coefficient, upper-bound
of the identified set, associated to each delta. The vertical red line is the IV estimated
coefficient.
This figure shows that a low δ, such as −1.17, is associated with an identified set in-
cluding the IV estimated coefficient. Therefore, the IV estimates fall into any identified set
associated with δ ≤ −1.17. To put it simply, it suffices that selection on unobservables is
22Note in the data set Cov(finesrmy, policery) > 0.
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20% larger than selection on observables for the IV estimate of the main specification to lie
in the identified set. This evidence supports that IV estimates are not too large compared
to OLS estimates.
There might be the further concern that OLS and IV estimates differ from each other
because of effect heterogeneity. If this is the case, insofar as the effect is greater in magni-
tude for the subgroup of the compliers, IV estimates would be different from OLS simply
because the former are averaging the causal effect for the compliers and not for the en-
tire population as the latter. To shed light on this issue I carry out an analysis similar to
Bhuller et al. (2020).
First, I use data in 1997 and 1998 to cumulate the number of pimps arrested in each
region. The aim of this variable is to proxy prostitution prior to the introduction of the
ban. I then create an indicator variable taking value one if pimps were arrested in those
years and zero otherwise. Second, I cumulate the number of fines during the ban in each
region. Hence, by splitting the sample in below and above the median of this variable, I
can divide the total observations in two subsamples of similar size.
If the IV estimates differ from OLS ones since effects are heterogeneous across the
population and the are former averaging only the effect for the share of population with
larger effects, it would make sense to think that such effects would be larger for regions
with higher prostitution known by the police where the risk to get a fine is higher. Sim-
ilarly, such effects should be higher in regions where the police issues many fines for
prostitution, either because there is higher demand or because the police is more ”capa-
ble” to catch customers of prostitutes. Hence, I would expect to find that the first stage
results are statistically negative and larger, in absolute value, in regions that are either
above the median of cumulated fines or that exhibited higher levels of prostitution prior
to the ban. By exploring the first-stage results by subgroups I can check whether there is
evidence supporting that the subgroups were defined correctly.
The last column of Table 9 shows the results of the first stage regression separated
for regions either below or above the median. As expected results for regions above
the median are statistically negative and larger, in absolute value, than those for regions
above the median. This result suggests that this division of the sample makes sense and
there are heterogeneous effects across regions.
Likewise, the last row of Table 9 shows the results of the first stage regression sepa-
rated for regions with lower and higher prostitution. Also in this case the instruments
have stastically negative effects on fines for sex purchase in regions with more prosti-
tution, while the point estimates are positive and statistically zero for regions with low
prostitution.
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The inner part of Table 9 shows results of the first stage regression for each sub-sample
combining the two categories above discussed. For the sample below the median we find
that the the effect of the second instrument is statistically negative in the sub-sample
where prostitution is high. While for the sample above the median the first instrument is
statistically negative in the sub-sample where prostitution is high and the second instru-
ment has a negative point estimate.
As a whole, these results suggest that there might be effect heterogeneity and that
these divisions splitted the sample in four subcategories where the effect might differ.
Thereby, based on the first-stage analysis, Table 10 presents results for the structural and
reduced form equation re-weighted such that the proportion of compliers in each sub-
group matches the share of estimation sample for that subgroup. Results for both struc-
tural and reduced form equation are similar in sign and size to those for the unweighted
sample. This finding suggests that the difference between IV and OLS estimates cannot
be explained by heterogeneous effects due to observables.
6 Underlying mechanisms
This section uses secondary data to explore the underlying mechanisms that could
drive the findings of the paper. Namely, there are two mechanisms that could lead to
the found results: fines for the purchasing of sexual services might affect rape either via
demand of prostitution or via supply of prostitution.23
6.1 Supply of prostitution
Shifts of the supply of prostitution could affect both fines for the purchasing of sexual
services and rape. As a matter of fact, given the causal evidence that decriminalizing
prostitution reduces rape (Bisschop et al. 2017; Cunningham and Shah 2018), a downward
shift of the supply of prostitution could affect fines for the purchasing of sexual services
and, as a consequence, could boost rape.
However, a priori the effect of fines for the purchasing of sexual services on the sup-
ply of prostitution is unclear. On the one hand, it could be that such fines disincentivize
the sale of sex and so reduce prostitution. On the other hand, it could be that such fines
incentivize the sale of sex since this law makes clear that prostitutes are not going to be
prosecuted.24 Given the negative causal relationship between rape and prostitution men-
23Appendix Section F considers additional specifications that might be useful to shed further light on
the mechanisms here analyzed.
24Especially with respect to before 1999, at that time prostitution was not regulated in Sweden.
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tioned above and the findings of this paper, it seems reasonable to expect that banning
the purchase of prostitution might have shifted downward the supply of prostitution .
To shed light on this issue, I gather data about the number of pimps to proxy the supply
of prostitution.25 There are two issues worth mentioning. First, since each pimp controls
many prostitutes, the number of pimps might be seen as a lower bound of the supply of
prostitution. Second, I make use of the number of arrested pimps. This variable is the
outcome of an equilibrium between arrests and the prostitution market. Compositional
changes in such two variables (e.g. changes in the number of prostitutes that work with-
out a pimp or in the behavior of officers choosing whether to search for pimps) might
affect the results using this proxy.
Figure 7 presents the estimated coefficients, and respective 90% confidence intervals,
of running the main IV specification, with pimps as dependent variable, using either
both instruments (main first stage regression), only z1rmy, only z2rmy or their sum (i.e.
z1rmy + z2rmy).
26 Estimates are statistically positive and range between 0.05 and 0.06. This
evidence suggests that the introduction of fines for sex purchase raises convicted pimps.
Hence, these results do not support a decline in the supply of prostitution. It is worth
noting that pimps are a better proxy of coercive prostitution than of non-coercive pros-
titution. Given that non-coercive prostitution is legal in Sweden, there is no reason to
believe that the introduction of the ban discourages such activity. While, since the intro-
duction of ban raises awareness on prostitution, it could discourage procuring, and as
a consequence, coercive prostitution. Hence, coercive prostitution seems to be a lower
bound to non-coercive prostitution.
6.2 Demand of prostitution
Using as dependent variable a proxy of the demand of prostitution would violate the
exclusion restriction since the instruments affect the behavior of prostitutes’ customers.
Hence in this section, in order to assess whether fines for sex purchase might shift the
demand of prostitution, I explore changes in the composition of rapes.
Given the causal evidence that decriminalizing prostitution reduces rape found in the
afore-mentioned literature, economic theory would predict that changes in the demand
of prostitution could affect the types of rape committed. In this section I explore the effect
25 Pimp (or procurer) means a person, especially a man, who controls prostitutes and arrange customers
for them, usually in return for a share of the earnings. In Sweden even if selling sex is not penalized, making
money out of prostitutes, such as pimping is a crime. For this reason, Bra˚ also collects data on the number
of convicted pimps.
26Exclusion restriction and exogeneity of the instruments seem plausible also for this dependent vari-
able. Recall the instruments work through customers and so the demand of prostitution.
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of fines for the purchasing of sexual services on attempted vs completed rapes and indoor
vs outdoor rapes.
Figure 8 shows the estimated coefficients, and respective 90% confidence intervals, of
running the main IV specification for attempted and completed rape using either both
instruments (main first stage regression), only z1rmy, only z2rmy or their sum (i.e. z1rmy +
z2rmy).
Findings are stable across regression models. Fines for sex purchase reduce attempted
rapes but increase completed rapes. This evidence supports that fines for sex purchase
affect the demand of prostitution.
Two reasonings could justify the increase in completed rape with respect to attempted
rape. First, given the causal evidence that prostitution reduces rape, but the higher
penalty for the latter than for the former, economic theory would predict that increas-
ing the relative price of prostitution would raise the consumption of rape. This would
explain why completed rapes went up at the expense of a decline in attempted rapes.
Second, a branch of the literature of evolutionary biology and evolutionary psychol-
ogy predicts that when consensual sex becomes more difficult (i.e. competition for fe-
males is most intense) completed rape increases since it is an adaptive strategy in past
human environments (Thornhill and Thornhill 1983; Thornhill and Palmer 2000a,b).
Likewise, Figure 9 shows the estimated coefficients, and respective 90% confidence
intervals, of running the main IV specification for indoor and outdoor rape using either
both instruments (main first stage regression), only z1rmy, only z2rmy or their sum (i.e.
z1rmy + z2rmy). This figure shows that fines for sex purchase led to an increase in outdoor
rape, while they did not affect indoor rape.27
All in all, from both figures it is clear that the composition of rapes changed. This
evidence is in line with the hypothesis that banning the purchase of prostitution affects
the demand of prostitution.
7 Conclusion
This article leverages variation in access to sex tourism to estimate the causal effect of
criminalizing the purchase of prostitution on rape in Sweden. It finds that criminalizing
27This result differs from (Berlin et al. 2019). It might be that this discrepancy is due to the distinct source
of identifying variation used. Their paper leverages variation in the share of female politicians and police
officers to proxy stricter enforcement of the ban against sex purchase. It might be that these main regressors
also correlate with stricter enforcement of the Kvinnofrid law (which encompasses rape as well). Yet, as a
whole, their results are coherent with the findings of this paper. They find that banning the purchase of
prostitution might have reduced the size of the prostitution market but had important spillover effects on
crimes outside the prostitution market, namely on domestic violence.
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the purchase of prostitution increases rape temporarily.
Specifically, the findings of this paper suggest this regulation rose rape by 47 % from
1999 to 2014. Results also indicates that this regulation changes the composition of rapes
committed: increasing completed and outdoor rapes. This evidence supports that the
found effect is demand-driven. Lastly, to the best of my knowledge, this paper is one of
the first to suggest usage of a comprehensive methodology such as the one developed in
(Oster (2017)) to compare sizes of OLS and IV estimates.
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Figures & Tables
Figure 1: Evolution of fines for sex purchase and rape in Sweden
Notes: This figure shows the number of rapes (in logs) and fines for sex purchase in
Sweden according to Bra˚ during the period 1997-2014.
Figure 2: Distribution of rape
Notes: Histogram of rapes in Sweden according to Bra˚ during the period 1997-2014.
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Figure 3: Airport-region distance by car using Google maps, example
Notes: Distance from the closest airport to the region computed via Google maps and
using car vehicle option. Example: Stockholm county.
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Figure 4: First-stage placebo test: randomization inference z1rmy
Notes: results of randomizing z1rmy stratified at time period level with 1,000
permutations. The red vertical line represents the estimated coefficient of the main
specification. The intersection between the red vertical line and the estimated
distribution could be interpreted as the probability of finding an estimated coefficient as
large as my estimates by chance. Only 1 regression, out of 1,000, could replicate such
estimate.
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Figure 5: First-stage placebo test: randomization inference z2rmy
Notes: results of randomizing z2rmy stratified at time period level with 1,000
permutations. The red vertical line represents the estimated coefficient of the main
specification. The intersection between the red vertical line and the estimated
distribution could be interpreted as the probability of finding an estimated coefficient as
large as my estimates by chance. Only 8 regressions, out of 1,000, could replicate such
estimate.
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Figure 6: Estimated coefficients, upper-bound of the identified set depending on δ
Notes: results of using Oster (2017) methodology to estimate identified sets of the
estimated coefficient assuming selection on observables is proportional to selection on
unobservables. The red vertical line represents the IV estimate of the main specification.
The figure shows any δ lower than −1.2 is associated to an identified set containing such
IV estimates.
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Figure 7: Effect on pimps
Notes: This figure shows the estimated coefficients, and respective 90 % confidence
intervals, of running the main IV specification for pimps using either both instruments
(main first stage regression), only z1rmy, only z2rmy or their sum. These findings suggest
fines for sex purchase increase pimps. Results are robust across specifications.
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Figure 8: Effect on attempted vs completed rape
Notes: This figure shows the estimated coefficients, and respective 90 % confidence
intervals, of running the main IV specification for attempted and completed rape using
either both instruments (main first stage regression), only z1rmy, only z2rmy or their sum.
Completed rapes increase, while attempted rapes reduce. Results are robust across
specifications.
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Figure 9: Effect on indoor vs outdoor rape
Notes: This figure shows the estimated coefficients, and respective 90 % confidence
intervals, of running the main IV specification for attempted and completed rape using
either both instruments (main first stage regression), only z1rmy, only z2rmy or their sum.
Outdoor rapes increase, while indoor rapes stay unchanged. Results are robust across
specifications.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Panel A: Whole period
Rape mean median s.d.
Completed 9.99 5 16.3
Attempted 1.39 1 2.41
Outdoor 2.57 1 4.21
Indoor 8.81 4 14.53
Total 11.38 6 18.06
Fines for sex purchase 1.31 0 7.35
Pimps .28 0 .93
Observations 4,536
Panel B: Before the introduction of the ban
Rape mean median s.d.
Completed 4.81 2 8.06
Attempted 1.35 0 2.8
Outdoor 1.57 1 2.76
Indoor 4.59 2 7.83
Total 6.16 3 9.92
Fines for sex purchase 0 0 0
Pimps .09 0 .37
Observations 504
Panel C: After the introduction of the ban
Rape mean median s.d.
Completed 10.64 5 16.94
Attempted 1.39 1 2.36
Outdoor 2.69 1 4.34
Indoor 9.34 5 15.08
Total 12.03 6 18.73
Fines for sex purchase 1.47 0 7.78
Pimps .3 0 .97
Observations 4,032
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
VARIABLES
Panel A
z1rmy -0.00505*** -0.00505*** -0.00568*** -0.00568***
(0.000889) (0.00163) (0.000895) (0.00184)
z2rmy -0.000261*** -0.000261*** -0.000307*** -0.000307***
(2.10e-05) (8.44e-05) (2.58e-05) (9.94e-05)
z1rmy + z2rmy -0.000322*** -0.000322***
(2.74e-05) (0.000104)
KP F-stat 77.54 40.20 141.98 137.87
p value coeff 0.00
Panel B
z1rmy 40km -0.00503*** -0.00503*** -0.00567*** -0.00567***
(0.000901) (0.00163) (0.000901) (0.00183)
z2rmy 40km -0.000265*** -0.000265*** -0.000312*** -0.000312***
(2.42e-05) (8.57e-05) (2.82e-05) (0.000101)
z1rmy + z2rmy 40km -0.000326*** -0.000326***
(2.94e-05) (0.000105)
KP F-stat 64.71 39.61 121.79 123.26
p value coeff 0.00
Panel C
z1rmy 60km -0.00505*** -0.00505*** -0.00568*** -0.00568***
(0.000889) (0.00163) (0.000895) (0.00184)
z2rmy 60km -0.000261*** -0.000261*** -0.000308*** -0.000308***
(2.12e-05) (8.46e-05) (2.59e-05) (9.96e-05)
z1rmy + z2rmy 60km -0.000323*** -0.000323***
(2.75e-05) (0.000104)
KP F-stat 77.07 40.27 141.64 138.01
p value coeff 0.00
Observations 4,416 4,416 4,416 4,416 4,416 4,416 4,416 4,416
Clustered variance at Regional level Y Wild Y Wild Y Wild Y Wild
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
# of Policemen Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Regional Year Trends Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
IV z1rmy and z2rmy z1rmy and z2rmy Only z1rmy Only z1rmy Only z2rmy Only z2rmy z1rmy+z2rmy z1rmy + z2rmy
Clustered standard errors at region level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
First stage Reduced form
z3rmy 0.00173 0.00112 0.00895 0.00135 -0.000230 -5.31e-06
(0.00781) (0.00766) (0.0127) (0.00159) (0.000191) (0.000199)
z4rmy 0.00280 0.00218 0.00832 0.00180 -0.000340 -8.84e-05
(0.00858) (0.00838) (0.0131) (0.00185) (0.000267) (0.000246)
z5rmy -0.00275 -0.00211 -0.00882 -0.00161 0.000309 7.36e-05
(0.00814) (0.00799) (0.0129) (0.00169) (0.000235) (0.000219)
Observations 4,416 4,416 4,416 4,416 4,416 4,416
Clustered variance at Regional level Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
# of Policemen Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y N Y Y
Regional Year Trends N N Y N N Y
Clustered standard errors at region level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Regression results for Sweden
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
VARIABLES
Fines for sex purchase 0.00104 0.0859 0.00118** 0.0291 0.00131** 0.0189**
(0.00124) (0.0680) (0.000432) (0.0205) (0.000470) (0.00745)
Observations 4,536 4,416 4,536 4,416 4,536 4,416
Clustered variance at Regional level Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
# of Policemen Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N N Y Y Y Y
Regional Year Trends N N N N Y Y
Baseline mean 6.16 6.16 6.16 6.16 6.16 6.16
Baseline std. dev. 9.92 9.92 9.92 9.92 9.92 9.92
Clustered standard errors at region level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
Fines for sex purchase 0.0189** 0.0219** 0.0147* 0.0152*
(0.00745) (0.00933) (0.00852) (0.00821)
Panel B 40 km
Fines for sex purchase 0.0200*** 0.0264*** 0.0115 0.0126*
(0.00718) (0.00985) (0.00763) (0.00738)
Panel C 60 km
Fines for sex purchase 0.0190** 0.0219** 0.0150* 0.0154*
(0.00750) (0.00935) (0.00862) (0.00829)
Observations 4,416 4,416 4,416 4,416
Clustered variance at Regional level Y Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y
Regional Year Trends Y Y Y Y
# of Policemen Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y
IV z1rmy and z2rmy Only z1rmy Only z2rmy z1rmy+z2rmy
Baseline mean 6.16 6.16 6.16 6.16
Baseline std. dev. 9.92 9.92 9.92 9.92
Clustered standard errors at region level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 6: Robustness: functional form
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES IHS Rape IHS Rape IHS Rape IHS Rape
Fines for sex purchase 0.0247*** 0.0260*** 0.0248*** 0.0166*
(0.00945) (0.00914) (0.00951) (0.00994)
Observations 4,416 4,416 4,416 4,416
Clustered variance at Regional level Y Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y
# of Policemen Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Regional Year Trends Y Y Y Y
IV z1rmy and z2rmy z1rmy and z2rmy z1rmy and z2rmy z1rmy + z2rmy
40 km 60 km
Baseline mean 6.16 6.16 6.16 6.16
Baseline std. dev. 9.92 9.92 9.92 9.92
Clustered standard errors at region level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
z1rmy -0.000220 -0.000194 -0.000268 -0.000245* -0.000122** -0.000108**
(0.000175) (0.000179) (0.000167) (0.000136) (5.54e-05) (4.63e-05)
z2rmy 1.15e-05 1.14e-05 1.11e-05 -2.04e-05*** -5.16e-06* -5.27e-06*
(1.56e-05) (1.56e-05) (1.56e-05) (6.52e-06) (2.81e-06) (2.75e-06)
Observations 504 504 504 3,912 3,912 3,912
Clustered variance at Regional level Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
# of Policemen Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y N Y Y
Regional Year Trends N N Y N N Y
Period Before the ban Before the ban Before the ban After the ban After the ban After the ban
Clustered standard errors at region level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
z1rmy 0.00251 0.00322 0.00358* -8.17e-05 -6.50e-05 -5.95e-05*
(0.00165) (0.00219) (0.00207) (8.95e-05) (3.95e-05) (3.27e-05)
z2rmy -5.75e-07 1.43e-05 9.36e-06 -1.10e-05** -2.37e-06 -2.43e-06
(2.26e-05) (2.16e-05) (1.93e-05) (4.21e-06) (3.04e-06) (2.81e-06)
Observations 1,850 1,850 1,850 2,062 2,062 2,062
Clustered variance at Regional level Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
# of Policemen Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y N Y Y
Regional Year Trends N N Y N N Y
Sample Below median Below median Below median Above median Above median Above median
Clustered standard errors at region level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9: First stage
Proxy prostitution
Cumulated fines
Low (i.e. 0) High (i.e. > 0)
Below median z1rmy 0.00137 0.000378 -0.000305
(0.254) (0.000232) (0.000403)
z2rmy -6.02e-05 -9.63e-05*** -9.67e-05***
(4.23e-05) (9.71e-06) (4.89e-06)
Observations 1,373 562 1,935
Above median z1rmy 0.259 -0.00297*** -0.00377***
(0.254) (0.000663) (0.00111)
z2rmy 0.00138 -0.000112 -0.000209***
(0.00120) (0.000106) (5.53e-05)
Observations 1,243 734 1,977
z1rmy 0.224 -0.00467***
(0.210) (0.000859)
z2rmy 0.000604 -0.000245***
(0.000418) (6.45e-05)
Observations 2,616 1,296
Notes: First stage results of dividing the sample in 4 mutually-exclusive subcategories
according to prostitution and fines for sex purchase. All regressions include region FE,
month FE, year FE, police control and regional year trends. Clustered variance at region
level in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10: Reweighted OLS & RF
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A OLS: Structural equation
Fines for sex purchase 0.000956 0.00125*** 0.00141***
(0.00141) (0.000419) (0.000410)
Panel B Reduced Form
z1rmy -0.000329* -0.000162** -0.000144**
(0.000185) (7.71e-05) (5.76e-05)
z2rmy -2.38e-05** -4.95e-06* -5.62e-06**
(8.44e-06) (2.62e-06) (2.67e-06)
Observations 4,032 4,032 4,032
Clustered variance at Regional level Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y
# of Policemen Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y
Regional Year Trends N N Y
Clustered standard errors at region level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
38
References
Anderson, M. J. (2004). Prostitution and trauma in US rape law. Journal of trauma prac-
tice 2(3-4), 75–92.
Arunachalam, R. and M. Shah (2008). Prostitutes and brides? The American Economic
Review 98(2), 516–522.
Berlin, M. P., G. Immordino, F. Russo, and G. Spagnolo (2019). Prostitution and violence.
Working Paper.
Bhuller, M., G. B. Dahl, K. V. Løken, and M. Mogstad (2020). Incarceration, recidivism,
and employment. Journal of Political Economy 128(4), 1269–1324.
Bisschop, P., S. Kastoryano, and B. van der Klaauw (2017, November). Street prostitution
zones and crime. Technical Report 4.
Cameron, A. C., J. B. Gelbach, and D. L. Miller (2008). Bootstrap-based improvements for
inference with clustered errors. The Review of Economics and Statistics 90(3), 414–427.
Cameron, L., J. Muz, and M. Shah (2019). Crimes of morality: Unintended consequences
of criminalizing sex work. Technical report, UCLAWorking Paper.
Cameron, S. (2002). The economics of sin: rational choice or no choice at all? Edward Elgar
Publishing.
Cameron, S. and A. Collins (2003). Estimates of a model of male participation in the
market for female heterosexual prostitution services. European Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics 16(3), 271–288.
Cameron, S., A. Collins, and N. Thew (1999). Prostitution services: an exploratory empir-
ical analysis. Applied Economics 31(12), 1523–1529.
Cho, S.-Y., A. Dreher, and E. Neumayer (2013). Does legalized prostitution increase hu-
man trafficking? World Development 41, 67–82.
Ciacci, R. (2017). The Effect of Unilateral Divorce on Prostitution: Evidence from Divorce
Laws in U.S. States. Working paper, European University Institute.
Ciacci, R., A. Murr, and E. Rasco´n (2019). A Matter of Size: Comparing IV and OLS
estimates. Working paper.
39
Ciacci, R. and M. M. Sviatschi (2016). The effect of indoor prostitution on sex crime:
Evidence from new york city. Technical report, Columbia University Working Paper.
Cunningham, S. and T. D. Kendall (2011a). 10 prostitution, technology, and the law: new
data and directions. Research handbook on the economics of family law, 221.
Cunningham, S. and T. D. Kendall (2011b). Men in transit and prostitution: Using political
conventions as a natural experiment. The BE Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy 11(1).
Cunningham, S. and T. D. Kendall (2011c). Prostitution 2.0: The changing face of sex
work. Journal of Urban Economics 69(3), 273–287.
Cunningham, S. and M. Shah (2018). Decriminalizing indoor prostitution: Implications
for sexual violence and public health. The Review of Economic Studies 85(3), 1683–1715.
Della Giusta, M. (2010). Simulating the impact of regulation changes on the market for
prostitution services. European journal of law and economics 29(1), 1–14.
Della Giusta, M., M. L. Di Tommaso, I. Shima, and S. Strøm (2009). What money buys:
clients of street sex workers in the us. Applied Economics 41(18), 2261–2277.
Della Giusta, M., M. L. Di Tommaso, and S. Strøm (2009). Who is watching? the market
for prostitution services. Journal of Population Economics 22(2), 501–516.
Di Tella, R. and E. Schargrodsky (2004). Do police reduce crime? estimates using the
allocation of police forces after a terrorist attack. American Economic Review 94(1), 115–
133.
Draca, M., S. Machin, and R. Witt (2011). Panic on the streets of london: Police, crime,
and the july 2005 terror attacks. American Economic Review 101(5), 2157–81.
Dustmann, C., K. Vasiljeva, and A. P. Damm (2016). Refugee migration and electoral
outcomes. CReAM DP 19, 16.
Edlund, L., J. Engelberg, and C. A. Parsons (2009). The wages of sin. Columbia University
Economics Discussion Paper (0809-16).
Edlund, L. and E. Korn (2002). A theory of prostitution. Journal of political Economy 110(1),
181–214.
European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2014). Violence against women: An
eu-wide survey. main results report.
40
Farley, M. and H. Barkan (1998). Prostitution, violence, and posttraumatic stress disorder.
Women & health 27(3), 37–49.
Farley, M., A. Cotton, J. Lynne, S. Zumbeck, F. Spiwak, M. E. Reyes, D. Alvarez, and
U. Sezgin (2004). Prostitution and trafficking in nine countries: An update on violence
and posttraumatic stress disorder. Journal of trauma practice 2(3-4), 33–74.
Gertler, P. and M. Shah (2007). Sex work and infection: What is law enforcement got to
do with it?
Gertler, P., M. Shah, and S. M. Bertozzi (2005). Risky business: the market for unprotected
commercial sex. Journal of political Economy 113(3), 518–550.
Jakobsson, N. and A. Kotsadam (2013). The law and economics of international sex slav-
ery: prostitution laws and trafficking for sexual exploitation. European Journal of Law
and Economics 35(1), 87–107.
Lee, S. and P. Persson (2013). Human trafficking and regulating prostitution. NYU Stern
School of Business EC-12-07, 12–08.
Manieri, M., H. Svensson, and M. Stafstro¨m (2013). Sex tourist risk behaviour–an on-
site survey among swedish men buying sex in thailand. Scandinavian journal of public
health 41(4), 392–397.
Moffatt, P. and S. Peters (2001). The pricing of personal services. Technical report, mimeo.
Oster, E. (2017). Unobservable selection and coefficient stability: Theory and evidence.
Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 1–18.
Pruth, C. (2007). Sun, sea, sex and swedes. a study of campaigns to prevent sex tourism
in natal/brazil and stockholm/sweden.
Steinman, K. J. (2002). Sex tourism and the child: Latin america’s and the united states’
failure to prosecute sex tourists. Hastings Women’s LJ 13, 53.
Sullivan, B. (2007). Rape, prostitution and consent. Australian & New Zealand Journal of
Criminology 40(2), 127–142.
Svanstro¨m, Y. (2005). Through the prism of prostitution: Conceptions of women and
sexuality in sweden at two fins-de-sie`cle. NORA-Nordic Journal of Feminist and Gender
Research 13(1), 48–58.
41
Thornhill, R. and C. Palmer (2000a). A Natural History of Rape. MIT Press.
Thornhill, R. and C. Palmer (2000b). Why men rape. New York Academy of Sciences.
Thornhill, R. andN.W. Thornhill (1983). Human rape: An evolutionary analysis. Ethology
and Sociobiology 4(3), 137 – 173.
Von Hofer, H. (2000). Crime statistics as constructs: The case of swedish rape statistics.
european Journal on criminal Policy and research 8(1), 77–89.
Weibull, S. (2003). Child prostitution and sex tourism: Brazil-sweden.
42
Appendix
A Descriptive statistics and figures of the instruments
Table A.1 shows the airport used for each county. Table A.2 shows descriptive statistics
of the instruments. As expected, variation in offering of flights increased over years. The
number of observations in the whole period is smaller than in Table 1 since data on flights
presented missing values in 2005.
Figures A.1 and A.2 respectively plot the distribution over months of z1rmy and z2rmy
with respect to fines for sex purchase. Two features are clear from these figures. First, as
sex tourism patterns would predict, there appears to be a negative correlation between
each instrument and the endogenous variable: i.e. when the former increases the latter
decreases. Second, the bulk of the variation in the instruments takes place in summer and
winter months; this motivates the inclusion of month fixed effects.
Likewise, Figures A.3 and A.4 respectively plot the evolution over years of z1rmy and
z2rmy compared to fines for sex purchase. Both figures show that there appears to be a
negative correlation between the instruments and the endogenous variable also at year
level. Moreover, the three variables show an upward trend. This last feature motivates
the inclusion of year fixed effects and year trends.28
28Note that these figures are graphical depictions of the first stage.
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Table A.1: Airport used for each county
County Closest main airport
Blekinge RNB Ronneby Airport
Dalarna MXX Mora Siljan Airport
Gotland VBY Visby Airport
Ga¨vleborg la¨n MXX Mora Siljan Airport
Halland HAD Halmstad City Airport
Ja¨mtland la¨n OSD A˚re O¨stersund Airport
Jo¨nko¨ping JKG Jo¨nko¨ping Airport
Kalmar KLR Kalmar Airport
Kronoberg VXO Va¨xjo¨ Airport
Norrbotten GEV Ga¨llivare Airport
Ska¨ne la¨n KID Kristianstad Airport
Stockholm ARN Stockholm Arlanda Airport
So¨dermanland NYO Stockholm Skavsta Airport
Uppsala ARN Stockholm Arlanda Airport
Va¨rmland KSD Karlstad Airport
Va¨sterbotten SQO Storuman Airport closed in June 2010 then HMV Hemavan Airport
Va¨sternorrland la¨n KRF Ho¨ga Kusten Airport
Va¨stmanland VST Stockholm Va¨stera˚s Airport
Va¨stra Go¨taland THN Trollha¨ttan Va¨nersborg Airport
O¨rebro la¨n ORB O¨rebro Airport
O¨stergo¨tland LPI Linko¨ping City Airport
Table A.2: Summary statistics: instruments
Panel A: Whole period
mean median s.d.
z1rmy 4.02 0 41.15
z2rmy 73.02 0 670.80
Observations 4,416
Panel B: Before the introduction of the ban
mean median s.d.
z1rmy 2.3 0 23.26
z2rmy 49.12 0 520.16
Observations 504
Panel C: After the introduction of the ban
mean median s.d.
z1rmy 4.24 0 42.91
z2rmy 76.1 0 687.81
Observations 3,912
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Figure A.1: z1rmy distribution over months
45
Figure A.2: z2rmy distribution over months
46
Figure A.3: z1rmy evolution over years
47
Figure A.4: z2rmy evolution over years
B Balancing tests: Instruments
A key assumption of the identification strategy is that variation in offering of flights
is not affected by the number of fines for sex purchase. This assumption seems plausible
since sex tourism comprises only a small fraction of demand for flights. Yet, this section
exploits the high frequency of the data set to shed light on this issue.29
There could be concerns that seasonal changes in fines for sex purchase influence flight
company decisions. In fact, since both offering of flights and sex tourism are seasonal,
and offering new flights go through a long approval process, it seems plausible to think
airlines could base their decision using fines for sex purchase in the same month of the
previous year. If this were the case I would expect airlines to offer more flights when
they think the demand is higher, this could happen in two different ways. On the one
hand, it could be that airlines base their decision on the amount of fines. On the other
29A similar analysis is available in Dustmann et al. (2016).
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hand, it could be they use the change in such fines. Thereby, I test whether either fines for
sex purchase in the year before, or their change, affects variation in offering of flights by
estimating the following regression models for both instruments i = 1, 2:
∆zirmy = θ∆finesrmy−1 + αr + αm + αy + αr ∗ y + γofficersry + εrmy (A.1)
∆zirmy = θfinesrmy−1 + αr + αm + αy + αr ∗ y + γofficersry + εrmy (A.2)
where ∆ is the first difference operator (at month level). Table A.3 present the results
of running regression models A.1 and A.2 for both z1rmy and z2rmy. In particular, columns
(1)-(3) and (4)-(6) present results for regression models A.1 and A.2 for instrument z1rmy,
while columns (7)-(9) and (10)-(12) respectively do the same for instrument z2rmy.
Estimated coefficients are negative and not statistically significant in any regression.
This evidence supports that fines for sex purchase do not affect variation of offering of
flights, in line, with the identification strategy.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES First difference
z1rmy z2rmy
First difference 12 months before -0.186 -0.186 -0.186 -2.716 -2.713 -2.708
(0.214) (0.215) (0.215) (3.150) (3.151) (3.154)
Lag 12 months before -0.205 -0.208 -0.210 -1.019 -1.145 -1.278
(0.232) (0.237) (0.244) (1.152) (1.309) (1.472)
Observations 4,133 4,133 4,133 4,154 4,154 4,154 4,133 4,133 4,133 4,154 4,154 4,154
Clustered variance at Regional level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
# of Policemen Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Regional Year Trends N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y
Clustered standard errors at region level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C Seasonality
This section explores the concern that results are driven by seasonality. Specifically,
there might be the concern that since flights change according to season, and the specifi-
cation is at month level, results might be driven by flights concentrating in certain months
of the year. To this extent, it is worth noting that each regression model previously con-
sidered includes month FE to capture such seasonal changes.
However, this section further addresses this issue by averaging the instruments across
months for each year such that variation only comes by each region and year (i.e. it
is constant for a certain year and region). Column (1) of Table A.4 shows the results
of the first stage specification using such two instruments. Similarly to the main first
stage specification, results suggest the two instruments reduce fines for sex purchase.
Moreover, the associated F-statistic is above 10 and the two instruments are statistically
different from each other as in the previous first stage regressions.
Column (2) of Table A.4 shows the IV estimates of this specification. Results are similar
in sign and size with the main IV estimates suggesting seasonality is not driving the
results.
Table A.4: Seasonality check
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Fines for sex purchase Log(1+Rape)
z¯1ry -0.115***
(0.00883)
z¯2ry -0.00593***
(0.000267)
Fines for sex purchase 0.0152***
(0.00567)
Observations 4,416 4,416
Clustered variance at Regional level Y Y
Region FE Y Y
Month FE Y Y
# of Policemen Y Y
Regional Year Trends Y Y
Regression First stage Second stage
KP F-stat 506.35
p value coeff 0.00
Clustered standard errors at region level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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D Balancing test: Reverse causality
Likewise, I can use the same analysis of Appendix Section B to shed light on the poten-
tial reverse causality affecting OLS estimates. Reverse causality arises from the concern
that rape could affect fines for sex purchase. I run the same regression model as in Ap-
pendix Section B but replacing the dependent variable with fines for sex purchase and the
main regressor with rape:
∆finesrmy = θ∆rapermy−1 + αr + αm + αy + αr ∗ y + γofficersry + εrmy (A.3)
∆finesrmy = θrapermy−1 + αr + αm + αy + αr ∗ y + γofficersry + εrmy (A.4)
Results of running regressions A.3 and A.4 are respectively shown from columns (1)
to (3) and (4) to (6) of Panel A of Table A.5. The coefficient associated with the main re-
gressor of equation A.3 is negative but statistically insignificant in all the three regressions
(columns (1) to (3)), while the coefficient associated with the main regressor of equation
A.4 is statistically negative in all three regressions. Since this evidence could seem incon-
clusive due to the different findings, Panel B and Panel C repeat the same analysis but
using respective the logarithmic and the IHS transformation of the dependent variable.
In both cases, both regressions produce statistically negative coefficients.
These coefficients are economic meaningful. In effect, column (6) of Panel A indicates
that an increase in rape of one standard deviation is associated to a decrease of about 0.3
fines for sex purchase. Given the average of fines for sex purchase this result stands for
20% decrease in fines for sex purchase.
If it is true that rape is negatively associated with prostitution, I should observe a
similar pattern to the one just described also using pimps as dependent variable. As
explained in Section 6 this variable proxies supply of prostitution. Columns (7) to (12)
of Table A.5 repeat the same analysis carried out above but using pimps as dependent
variable, in particular, these tables report results of the two following regressions:
∆pimpsrmy = θ∆rapermy−1 + αr + αm + αy + αr ∗ y + γofficersry + εrmy (A.5)
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∆pimpsrmy = θrapermy−1 + αr + αm + αy + αr ∗ y + γofficersry + εrmy (A.6)
Results show that coefficients associated to the main regressor are negative across all
regression models and statistically significant in four out of six cases. All in all, this evi-
dence suggests that reverse causality affects OLS estimates.
53
T
ab
le
A
.5:
B
alan
cin
g
test:
R
ev
erse
cau
sality
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES First difference
Fines for sex purchase Pimps
Panel A: Levels
First difference 12 months before -0.0134 -0.0134 -0.0134 -0.00238* -0.00237* -0.00236*
(0.00930) (0.00931) (0.00932) (0.00115) (0.00114) (0.00114)
Lag 12 months before -0.0150* -0.0154* -0.0164* -0.000982 -0.00106 -0.00122
(0.00802) (0.00838) (0.00904) (0.00105) (0.00109) (0.00114)
Panel B: Log(1+y)
First difference 12 months before -0.00232** -0.00231** -0.00232** -0.00155 -0.00154 -0.00154
(0.000821) (0.000818) (0.000820) (0.000902) (0.000898) (0.000901)
Lag 12 months before -0.00204*** -0.00207*** -0.00212*** -0.00113* -0.00119* -0.00124*
(0.000676) (0.000695) (0.000737) (0.000627) (0.000647) (0.000718)
Panel C: IHS
First difference 12 months before -0.00277** -0.00276** -0.00276** -0.00205* -0.00205* -0.00205*
(0.00101) (0.00101) (0.00101) (0.00117) (0.00116) (0.00117)
Lag 12 months before -0.00235*** -0.00238** -0.00243** -0.00148* -0.00156* -0.00163*
(0.000818) (0.000839) (0.000889) (0.000807) (0.000833) (0.000922)
Observations 4,263 4,263 4,263 4,284 4,284 4,284 4,263 4,263 4,263 4,284 4,284 4,284
Clustered variance at Regional level Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
# of Policemen Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Regional Year Trends N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y
Clustered standard errors at region level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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E Temporary vs permanent effect
This section explores whether the found effect is permanent or temporary. To do so
it runs five regressions (2 months prior and after the treatment takes place plus the main
specification). In each regression fines for sex purchase is instrumented with the corre-
sponding contemporaneous values of z1rmy and z2rmy. For example, for the t−2 regression
the endogenous variable is finesrm−2y and the instruments are z1rm−2y and z2rm−2y, for the
t−1 regression the endogenous variable is finesrm−1y and the instruments are z1rm−1y and
z2rm−1y.
Figure A.5 plots the results of these five regressions. Results show that fines increase
rape occurring in the same month. This evidence suggest that the effect of fines for sex
purchase on rape is temporary (i.e. on impact) rather than permanent.
Figure A.5: Temporary vs permanent effect
Notes: This figure shows the estimated coefficients, and respective 90 % confidence
intervals, of running the main IV specification for leads and lags of the treatment
variable instrumented with the corresponding contemporaneous values of z1rmy and
z2rmy. Fines for sex purchase have an effect only on rapes happening in the same month.
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F Additional Specifications
This section explores additional specifications to address two concerns. First, there
might be the concern that the identifying variation correlates with periods where there
is a lower amount of officers. Put it differently, since the variation in the instruments
come from periods with relative larger offerings of intercontinental flights, there might
be the concern that these periods are also when fewer officers work. If this is the case
the decrease in fines for sex purchase might be explained by this reduction in the number
of officers at work. To this end, columns (1) and (2) of Table A.6 respectively present
results, for both the reduced form and the second stage specifications, using shoplifting
and bicycle thefts as dependent variable.
These two crimes are much more likely to occurr than purchases of prostitution and
might be considered a proxy for the number of officers patrolling the streets. Furthermore,
given the first-stage result that the instruments affect fines for sex purchase, these two
crimes might also be seen as placebo outcomes since, to the best of my knowledge, there
is no evidence that any of the two is connected with prostitution. Therefore, we expect to
find statistically insignificant estimates of the effect of fines for sex purchase on these two
outcomes.
Columns (1) and (2) of Panel A of Table A.6 presents the results for the reduced form
specification. These results show that the instruments have no clear connection with any
of the crimes. Regarding shoplifting the two instruments are not statistically associated
with such a crime. As for bicycle thefts, the instruments show statistically significant
estimated coefficients but of opposite signs which makes no sense either with the concern
that both instruments correlates with a decrease in the number of officers working. In
addition, the point estimates associated to each instrument for both crimes change sign
across regressions (i.e. the first instrument has a negative point estimate with shoplifting
and positive with bike thefts, the opposite is true for the second instrument) suggesting
that there is no robust effect of such instruments on any of the two crimes. Panel B for
these regressions shows that, as expected, results suggest that fines for sex purchase do
not affect either of the two crimes.
Next, I explore crimes connected to either rape or prostitution. First, I consider sexual
coercion (column (3)), which differs from rape in the fact that in this case there might be
no intercourse, as long as sexual relations are asked ”quid pro quo” (i.e. in return for
something). If the instruments are proxing acces to sex tourism it might seem reasonable
to expect to find similar results to themain ones for this crime as well. Results suggest this
is exactly the case: both the reduced form and second stage regressions present similar
56
results to my main specification. Larger access to sex tourism reduces sexual coercion,
while the effect of fines for sex purchase on this crime is positive and of similar size (one
s.e. difference) to the main results. These findings suggest that a further unintended effect
of the ban has been to boost sexual coercion.
Second, I consider three crimes connected to prostitution but for which I do not have
data spanning the whole sample period, specifically, these crimes are non-sexual human
trafficking, sexual human trafficking and domestic violence. Given the restricted sam-
ple period, their close connection to prostitution and the fact that the identification as-
sumption was not thought for this analysis; these results should be interepreted carefully.
Non-sexual and sexual human trafficking might be viewed as proxies of the supply of
prostitution. Columns (4) and (5) respectively show the results for these two crimes. The
effect of the instruments on these two crimes is unclear: the first instrument seems to be
negatively associated with human trafficking while the second seem to positively asso-
ciated. At least, it is reassuring to find that across the two regressions the two estimates
do not flip sign. In regards of the effect of fines for sex purchase on these two crimes
results differ. There seems to be a surge in non-sexual trafficking and a decay in sexual
trafficking, but the latter is statistically insignificant. This might make sense since the ban
was introduced in an effort to reduce human trafficking in general and sexual trafficking
in particular, raising the charges for the latter. Hence, human traffickers might substitute
sexual trafficking with non-sexual one due to the increment in its relative price.
As for domestic violence (column (6)), the first instrument seem to be insignificant
while the second is positively associated to this crime. The second stage results fines for
sex purchase are associated to an ebb in domestic violence. These findings differ from
Berlin et al. (2019). To this extent it is worth mentioning that their analysis is focused on
domestic violence while mine is not and that the identifying variation and sample period
differ as well.30
30There might be concerns about the main results in this restricted sample (i.e. 2008 to 2014). Results
of both the first and second stage are stable along this sample period. While, the second stage estimate is
larger, 0.037, and statistically significant.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Sexual
VARIABLES Shoplifting Bike theft coercion Non-sex trafficking Sex trafficking Domestic violence
Panel A Reduced Form
z1rmy -9.80e-06 0.000299*** -0.000137*** -0.000275*** -5.56e-05*** 2.01e-05
(1.38e-05) (7.33e-05) (2.79e-05) (3.78e-05) (1.87e-05) (4.86e-05)
z2rmy 2.30e-07 -1.48e-05*** -8.24e-06** 1.07e-05*** 1.13e-05*** 1.59e-05***
(1.99e-06) (2.91e-06) (3.28e-06) (1.75e-06) (1.98e-06) (2.82e-06)
Panel B Second Stage
Fines for sex purchase 0.000738 -0.0103 0.0290*** 0.0164*** -0.00777 -0.0314**
(0.00347) (0.00653) (0.00903) (0.00461) (0.00934) (0.0140)
Observations 4,416 4,416 4,416 1,029 1,533 1,580
Clustered variance at Regional level Y Y Y Y Y Y
Region FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Month FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
# of Policemen Y Y Y Y Y Y
Year FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Regional Year Trends Y Y Y Y Y Y
Sample Period All All All 2008-2012 2008-2014 2008-2014
Clustered standard errors at region level in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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